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About this series 
 
 
The purpose of the project Public Private Partnerships and the Poor in Water and 
Sanitation is to determine workable processes whereby the needs of the poor are 
promoted in strategies which encourage public-private partnerships (PPP) in the 
provision of water supply and sanitation services. One of the key objectives is to fill 
some of the gaps which exist in evidence-based reporting of the facts and issues 
around the impacts of PPP on poor consumers. This series of reports present the 
interim findings and case studies of an analysis of both the pre-contract and 
operational phases of a number of PPP contracts. A broad view of PPPs has been 
taken and situations where the public sector is in partnership either with formal 
private sector companies, or with small scale local entrepreneurs, or with NGOs 
employed in a private sector capacity have been included. 
 
 
M. Sohail 
Series Editor 
 
vi 
Acknowledgements 
 
 
The series editor gratefully acknowledges the many different people who have 
willingly contributed in knowledge, opinion and in time to the development of this 
work.  
 
Special thanks to the people from low-income settlements of case locations who have 
contributed to the research and provided their perspective on the issue. We feel 
greatly indebted to them. 
 
vii 
Contents 
 
1.    Introduction and context...........................................................................................  1 
1.1    Statement ........................................................................................................... 1 
1.2    Background ......................................................................................................... 1 
1.3    Future dialogue .................................................................................................... 1 
 
2.    The regultory process ...............................................................................................  3 
2.1    Overview.............................................................................................................. 3 
2.2    A resume of regulation .......................................................................................... 4 
2.3    Alternative regulatory arrangements ........................................................................ 5 
2.4    Scope of regulation............................................................................................... 5 
 
3.    Practical experiences in setting up regulation in a low-income environment................9 
3.1    The process of creating a new regulatory body ......................................................... 9 
3.2    Information management .................................................................................... 10 
3.3    Relationship between regulator and operating company .......................................... 11 
3.4    Regulatory pitfalls ............................................................................................... 12 
3.5    Strategic planning of water services ...................................................................... 14 
3.6    Updating strategic plans ...................................................................................... 14 
 
4.    Dialogue on regulation in low-income environments .................................................17 
4.1    Regulatory aspects affecting all, including low-income customers............................. 17 
4.2    Key questions for feedback .................................................................................. 18 
 
5.    Selection of past projects ........................................................................................21 
5.1    Data gathering ................................................................................................... 21 
5.2    Recurring themes ............................................................................................... 22 
 
Appendix A:  Selection of past projects ...........................................................................23 
viii 
1 
1. 
 
Introduction and context 
 
1.1 Statement 
This report by has examined a number of projects and drawn upon our experience of 
regulation and PSP in the water sector.  We have attempted to detail the role of the 
regulator and identify recurring themes in relation to regulation and the poor.  We do 
not attribute findings to any specific project or contract, and highlight the 
shortcomings not as criticisms, but in the interest of sharing of knowledge and 
improving services to the poor in the long run. 
 
1.2 Background 
This report is a continuation of reports entitled  ‘PSP Strategy and the poor’ in April 
2000, which identified the principal stages of PSP involvement in the water sector, 
and examined the key themes in servicing the poor that arise at the planning stage. 
Another report ‘Private Sector Participation and the Poor: 2 – Implementation’ 
looked at the procurement and implementation stages of PSP contracts, and identified 
the key themes and constraints faced in putting PSP arrangements into place.  It 
discussed the  ability to accommodate pro-poor issues in their work, contrasted water 
services with other sectors that have secured better access to the poor and identified 
the additional resources required to promote pro-poor issues. 
 
This report is the third in this sequence and examines the regulation of water servcies 
with particular relevance to the poor.  It therefore completes a set of three reports that 
together cover the three principal steps of planning, implementation and regulation of 
PSP water service delivery 
 
1.3 Future Dialogue 
The purpose of this report is to create a framework for future dialogue, as we believe 
it is essential for this project to include the views and experiences of a wider audience, 
in order to further the understanding of regulation and to benefit the poor. 
 
Furthermore, unlike the stages for planning and developing strategy and procuring 
services through contract, the regulation of PSP arrangements has no fixed short-term 
delivery date. It is an on-going and evolving process and we structure this report to 
reflect this reality. 
 
2 
To promote the communication of ideas, this report includes a number of questions, 
firstly in Section 3 relating to practical experiences in setting up regulation in a low-
income environment, but principally Section 5 where we set key questions for 
feedback. 
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2. 
 
The regulatory process 
 
2.1 Overview 
This report is not intended to be a manual on water sector regulation but seeks to 
explain the relationship between the Regulator and the Utility in the context of issues 
concerning the poor.  In this section we present a general background to regulation in 
the water sector and highlight some of the key challenges to be faced by governments 
and regulators when implementing private sector involvement in the water services. 
We make observations on aspects of the regulatory process, which can facilitate 
protection of poor and other vulnerable customers. 
 
Regulation is a necessary component of any private sector participation in monopoly 
services as it aims to secure the proper performance of obligations (on all sides), fair 
play and protection of customers at large. Water customers comprise a wide spectrum 
of economic and social groups each with differing needs, expectations and financial 
circumstances. Poor and other vulnerable customers can represent a small proportion 
of the customer base yet warrant a disproportionally large amount of regulatory 
attention, if they are not to marginalised. 
 
The transition from public to private sector delivery in any service, fundamentally 
changes the role of government. Under public sector provision the Government acts as 
service provider, financier, custodian of assets and guardian of the public interest. 
Conversely with private provision Government necessarily distances itself from 
service delivery acting as standard setter, paymaster and supervisor of the contract(s) 
with the private sector which itself assumes Government’s former role in service 
delivery plus making a profit.  
 
This is a significant change in role for Government and full transition can take several 
years. Whilst Governments may be very capable of managing specific contracts for 
procurement of goods and services, developing to regulate long term operating 
contracts for providing essential services (with all the related financial, technical, 
environmental and social components) can be a steep learning curve. This has been 
amply demonstrated in the UK by many regulators including Ofwat. Several years 
have been needed to acquire sufficient information capability and legal capacity to 
effectively exert regulatory influence outside the central financial and service delivery 
areas. Thus, despite its high priority, achieving improvements in the delivery of social 
obligations and protecting vulnerable customers can take several years.  
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Understanding that acquiring this capacity and that changing government’s role from 
provider to regulator takes several years before it becomes effective may hold a key as 
to why regulators have made little progress in promoting pro-poor measures in the 
early years. 
 
Furthermore, with some exceptions, the driving forces behind private sector 
involvement in water services are invariably financial rather than social, especially 
where inward investment is needed and contracts are awarded on the basis of price. 
The PSP process generally seeks to maximise the degree of commitment (both 
financial and technical) of the private sector and an over zealous regulatory regime 
(even if it could be established within the time frame) could seriously undermine that 
commitment at a key stage.  
 
2.2 A resumé of regulation 
Common protection of customers’ collective interests through government organised 
regulation of private companies is well established in the UK, early examples being 
crude controls on the profits and standards provided by toll road and subsequently the 
canal and railway companies. During the late 19th century there was a large increase 
in the number of private companies involved in the monopoly provision of essential 
public services such as water, gas and electricity. Excessive profits, declining 
standards and abuse of monopoly power stimulated regulatory intervention and 
established the key tenets of modern regulatory principles – customer protection, price 
controls and service standards. 
 
Although regulation through controlling excessive profit and penalising poor 
performance evolved over the last hundred years, it has only relatively recently been 
developed to provide an incentive regime based on achievement selected output 
targets (rather than activity targets).  Modern incentive-based regulation embraces 
pricing, service standards, future planning and long-term sustainability and combines 
incentives, penalties and periodic rebasing of the initial contract conditions (licence) 
at the request of either party. The regulatory framework may also include controlling 
abuse of monopoly power, unfair discrimination between customers and encouraging 
efficiency. 
 
Underpinning regulatory effectiveness, (irrespective of the sector), ensures 
independence of action of the regulator and the absolute separation of the roles of 
service provider, regulator and political processes.  
 
In the drive to attract the private sector the importance, and indeed the true value, of 
regulation can be underestimated when promoting PSP in the water sector. Whilst it is 
generally recognised that wide-ranging regulation is essential for the proper 
administration of a PSP contract, the early regulatory regime invariably focuses on 
price-sensitive contract deliverables such as investment activity, enforcing service 
standards and payments to the PSP company. Only when these fundamentals are 
satisfactorily in balance can regulatory attention turn to protection of poor and other 
vulnerable customers both in terms of standards and prices. 
 
Regulation is therefore a codified process, enabled by a broad regulatory framework, 
which sets out the rules under which both service provider and regulator must operate. 
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This quasi-legal nature of regulation results in processes being open to scrutiny and 
challenge by all parties and constrains the regulator to act wholly within the capacity 
and authority given to him under the relevant legislation or contract provisions.  
 
Unless the regulatory framework properly contemplates issues in relation to 
services to the poor and confers on the regulator authority for acting, it is 
unlikely that pro-poor policies can be implemented in the early stages of a PSP 
contract. 
 
2.3 Alternative Regulatory Arrangements 
There are two alternative routes to establishing regulatory processes for the first time. 
The first involves setting a single national regulator covering an entire sector with a 
multiplicity of private sector providers (as in Ofwat in UK), whilst the second 
involves creating separate regulators on a contract by contract basis (as in EtoSS in 
Buenos Aires). In either case the regulatory powers may be restricted to a specific 
service as Ofwat in UK or can extend to cross various utility sectors as in the Office 
of Regulator General in Melbourne, Australia.  
 
In the Water Sector, the single national (or regional) regulator is appropriate where 
major changes are implemented and normally requires creating a dedicated regulatory 
office with effective institutional capacity. The process is enabled by legislation 
which ties existing laws with operating licences. Such national (or regional) 
regulation provides opportunities for ensuring universality and consistency of 
standards, comparisons between providers and for extensive customer involvement, in 
order to show how well utilities are meeting targets and levels that can  be achieved. 
This approach can be relatively inflexible and cumbersome for one-off PSP 
contracts that are frequently used in emerging economies. 
 
Conversely local regulation of individual contracts can be tailored to specific 
circumstances and is therefore more easily able to accommodate local needs and 
priorities.  Whilst existing national legislation for say service standards or customer 
protection will prevail, the contract between Government (or municipality) and the 
private operator will define the respective obligations and regulatory mechanisms.. 
While local regulation is comparatively easy to implement, it can result in 
greater focus on interpreting and applying contract terms rather than pursuing 
the wider regulatory principles. Additionally the smaller scale of local regulatory 
operations can result in institutional constraints and insufficient attention being 
directed to secondary issues such as protecting vulnerable groups or the poor. Equally 
there is no way for a local regulator to compare performance on a like-for-like basis 
with other utilities. The operator commands all information on operational 
performance but this can be checked by independent auditors on behalf of the 
regulator. 
 
2.4 Scope of Regulation 
Regulation in the water sector is wide-ranging and covers all performance aspects of 
water services delivery. For each of the services provided, i.e. water supply (including 
water quality), wastewater (including environmental standards) and stormwater these 
include the following 
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 Setting or adjusting the allowed prices of services  
 Monitoring performance in key areas and making interventions where necessary 
 Representing customers and taking up grievances with service providers 
 Assessing quality and environmental performance through monitoring and 
enforcement of standards  
 Representing national interests in connection with setting appropriate and 
affordable standards of service and determining overall water strategy (which 
may cause a revision to the PSP) 
 
The  provision of water services impinges upon many other governmental activities – 
such as public health, social welfare, environment, and general economic 
development. In consequence and to facilitate good governance, governments may 
choose to combine regulation of several activities under a single umbrella. Such 
organization  may regulate performance of all aspects of service provision in several 
sectors. This combining of regulatory responsibilities facilitates an integrated 
approach to setting standards and fosters a close linkage between performance 
standards and prices to customers across the board. By definition such regulatory 
arrangements require considerable institutional capacity but they can become 
cumbersome and bureaucratic especially if they are to exert pressure on utilities to 
meet the standards or implement tariff policies. 
 
Equally governments may create individual regulators for separate sectors.  In some 
cases regulatory separation exists even within a sector, for instance by separating 
regulation of environmental & health standards from regulation of prices, standards & 
performance. Whilst this approach may allow individual regulators to focus on their 
specific issues, in the water sector it risks the pursuit of high cost policies which are 
above customers’ price expectations. Self- regulation in the public sector has led to 
many levels of service falling below the standards, but with no publicity. 
 
Finally where PSP is adopted locally on an ad-hoc basis, for instance where individual 
municipalities or regions engage a private sector operator, regulation more closely 
resembles contract supervision than sector regulation. Such local regulators have to 
work within the ambit of other national regulators in relation to activities such as 
environmental protection, health or economic development. In these circumstances 
the utility may face regulation by several separate bodies and the nominated regulator 
under the PSP arrangement assumes the role more of a contract supervisor involved in 
performance monitoring, payment and price setting. 
 
Because water sector PSP in emerging economies to date has largely been 
implemented on a local basis at municipal or regional level this latter 
arrangement is more common. Arguably it is less capable of dealing with more 
complex issues such as protecting poor customers than the single or cross-sector 
arrangements described earlier.  
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Irrespective of the regulatory arrangements, setting standards, prices and monitoring 
services to the poor would fall within the ambit of economic regulation. As far as 
services to the poor are concerned the scope of economic regulation includes: 
 
 Tariff setting through periodic price reviews or triggered by significant changes, 
 Performance monitoring including financial, operational and customer service 
issues,  
 Payment of fees and incentives (or penalties) to the private company, 
 Ensuring that the contractual provisions are met (including insurance, 
indemnities and guarantees),  
 Taking regulatory actions in the event of performance failure including the 
settlement of disputes and termination in extremis,  
 Monitoring service provision performance including expansion, new supplies, 
environmental compliance and issues relating to customer management or 
disconnection for non payment. 
8 
 
9 
3. 
 
Practical experiences in setting up regulations in a 
low-income environment 
 
This Section identifies some of the key challenges faced by regulators (or contract 
supervisors) in setting up and administering PSP arrangements. It draws upon the 
consultants’ practical experience in creating contract supervisors (regulators) under 
water sector PSP programmes in low-income environments. Most of the cases relate 
to concession or management contracts under which regulation is effected locally 
through a contract framework as opposed to national policy. We draw out some 
recurring messages from past projects and pose questions to a wider audience as to 
how the policy impinges on provision of services to the poor. 
 
3.1 The Process of Creating a New Regulatory Body 
The PSP contract typically becomes effective some two months or so after conclusion 
of negotiations and award and signature of the contract(s) with the operator. This is 
effectively the date which the operating contract commences . The regulator is 
required to be up and running. This time lag between completing negotiations and 
commencing operations is needed to legally establish and enable any joint ventures, to 
register the operating companies and to put in place the financial infrastructure for 
operations. Preparation and mobilisation of the private operator’s staff and other 
technical resources also takes place at the same time. Similar preparation will take 
place in the public water utility and in the government office responsible for 
supervision (i.e. the regulator). Depending upon the scope and scale of  the PSP 
operations it is debatable whether two months is adequate.  
 
Question 1. 
 
Is it realistic to expect the regulator to be created and mobilised within some 
two months? Are pro-poor issues left behind in the rush to get the PSP 
arrangements up and running? 
 
By commencement, the regulator must be constitutionally established, legally 
enabled, adequately staffed and have sufficient capacity to effectively supervise the 
contract. The PSP arrangements require that most of the utility’s functions 
(operations, maintenance and customer management), staff and statutory obligations 
associated with delivering water services become the responsibility of the private 
operator. Both transition and ongoing operations are necessarily complex. Equally 
creating and resourcing the contract supervisor (regulator) is correspondingly 
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demanding – particularly at inception. As a result the regulatory and institutional 
arrangements can vary widely between utilities.  
 
A large part of the regulator’s responsibilities involve performance monitoring, 
payment certification and ensuring the proper development of the water services 
infrastructure (including extensions to provide services to low-income communities). 
The regulator therefore has an indirect responsibility for setting service standards and 
for ensuring financial sustainability though periodic tariff and performance target 
adjustments. In many cases these responsibilities may be jointly shared with other 
government bodies such as a water resources agency or planning agency who have a 
wider water sector planning remit. Whilst there is no “typical” institutional 
relationship world-wide, it is common for the overall regulatory functions to be 
split between several bodies.   
 
Question 2. 
 
Do the poor need a separate regulatory institution to provide customer 
representation, or should they remain included within the overall regulatory 
function? 
 
 
3.2 Information Management 
Initially, as a result of the successful bidder’s due diligence at tender stage and open 
access to planning and operational records, the operator will command considerably 
more information about the technical and commercial performance of the water 
services systems than the regulator. It takes time for the regulator to collect sufficient 
information to be on a level footing. This initial imbalance  (known as  
“Information Asymmetry”) arises from the following reasons, and is widespread 
in all emerging regulatory regimes and therefore can be more detrimental in 
low-income environments: 
 
 it can take two or three years to plan and implement performance improvements 
through investment or strengthened operations. The implementation period can 
be much longer where the service standards are abysmal or where assets are run 
down.  
 the skills available to the regulator can be less experienced in regulatory process 
than those of the operator (with experience in similar contracts elsewhere) 
which can reduce the regulatory impact. 
 the onus for data gathering and reporting rests with the operator whilst the 
regulator is confined to requesting and reviewing reports to inform regulatory 
action. 
 the regulator can assess performance only at macro level, whilst the operator has 
access to  management and commercial information for local areas. 
 there is little consistent cost and performance data in low-income environments 
for use as a yardstick against which to set standards or assess the performance. 
Historic data from the former public utility will likely have doubtful reliability 
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whilst external comparisons with peer utilities of similar size are questionable. 
Global benchmarking data may be used for comparing past performance but 
such comparisons can be statistically flawed and all situations are different. 
 
The consultants’ experience of similar emergent regulatory regimes worldwide, 
suggest that it could take at least five years for newly created regulators to acquire 
sufficient robust information to make a significant impact on performance or 
outcomes. 
 
The problem of information asymmetry initially hampered regulatory 
effectiveness following water privatisation in UK in 1989 where it took some ten 
years of regulatory monitoring together with several political initiatives to 
effectively exert regulatory pressure on the private companies. The balance has 
moved significantly in favour of the regulator with the successful implementation of a 
rigorous price determination in 1999. 
 
Question 3. 
 
How can robust information on services for the poor be collected more 
expediently to reduce ‘information asymmetry’ and improve regulation 
effectiveness? 
 
 
Private sector involvement in water services is growing rapidly in many low-income 
environments with many water sector PSP projects under consideration in Africa, 
Asia and Latin America. From the regulatory perspective, African Development Bank 
in association with DfID established a pan-African utility performance benchmarking 
project.  We suggest that there could be merit in new regulators in Africa (and in other 
regions) accessing information from that project and developing a forum for sharing 
experiences on cost and performance information for water services in the region. If 
this proves valuable there may be merit in adopting similar projects in other regions. 
We would caution however that using comparative data to contrast performance 
between similar organisations could have limited value in establishing targets for 
out-performance. The unambiguous and consistent preparation of data is not simple 
and may be subject to interpretation. 
 
Question 4. 
 
How can best practice on pro-poor regulatory policies be shared throughout 
different regions? 
 
 
3.3 Relationship between regulator and operating 
 company 
It is widely accepted that effective regulation is essential in order to successfully 
extract the full benefits of private sector participation in delivering water services. 
This requires a clear delineation of roles and responsibilities of customers, regulator 
and the private operator with transparent relationships between the parties.  
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Establishing this relationship in an even-handed manner whilst preserving 
independence and ensuring fairness to all parties can pose a particular challenge 
for regulator. This challenge is heightened where regulation concerns a small 
number of single sector providers. Notably contract supervisors (as regulators of 
single operators) can be open to criticism from one party or another for bias.  
 
An effective working relationship, albeit within strict limits of contractual 
responsibility and legal authority, depends on trust and understanding between 
individual personalities on opposite sides of the fence. Regulators as governmental 
bodies are publicly accountable and must conform to constitutional standards. 
Successful regulation seeks balanced outcomes including protection of customers at 
large. It is not in the customers’ interests for private operators to be under-funded and 
therefore unable to perform properly. 
 
Question 5. 
 
How can community groups and NGOs use their voice to  promote these 
effective working relations to the benefit of the poor? 
 
 
3.4 Regulatory Pitfalls 
The consultants have identified the following regulatory pitfalls where relationships 
between the water services provider and the contract supervisor (or regulator) have 
been too comfortable, are poor, or have broken down: 
 
 By-passing the Regulator:  On a concession in Latin America the private 
concessionaire has bypassed the regulator on a number of key issues in order to 
deal directly with government.  The credibility of the regulator has been 
undermined bringing into question the effectiveness of the regulatory 
mechanisms. 
 Distrust of foreign private management:  A management contract in the 
Caribbean was frustrated due to antagonism amongst members of the 
supervising board to the presence of a foreign private manager.  The board was 
obstructive, and this impaired the ability of the manager to perform, leading to 
the ultimate early termination of the contract. 
 Lack of Finance:  One PSP arrangement failed because the promised donor 
funding did not materialise due to macro-economic circumstances. This meant 
that the operator was unable to implement the investment programme and 
hence deliver the agreed performance improvements.  
 Failure of the State to fulfil its obligations:  The operator appointed for a PSP 
contract in Africa was unable to deliver the agreed performance improvements 
because the State-owned asset holding company failed to deliver its contractual 
commitment to fund the renewal of major plant. This resulted in financial stress 
to the operator. 
 Ineffective  relationship between Regulator and Government or Utility 
(regulatory capture): Where a regulator’s sphere of activity is confined to a 
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single supplier, or where external pressure and accountability is absent, a 
regulator can become over-familiar with the interests of one party or another. 
With the commercial advantage weighed towards the operator, the regulator 
can, by stealth, become dependent upon the operator for information which 
may result in a perceived cosy relationship between regulator and regulated. 
Such a situation can arise for instance where there is an split between the 
organisation responsible for providing bulk water (under government 
ownership) and that responsible for distribution to consumers (under PSP). An 
example of such an arrangement existed in southern Africa where the private 
distribution operator depended upon bulk supplies from several state owned 
water boards. Although these boards were in effect governmental, in reality 
they operated autonomously with little regulatory pressure and as effective 
monopolies with a free hand in setting tariffs and standards. This undermined 
the performance of the PSP operator. Similarly in Eastern Europe municipality 
based regulators have been criticised in audit for procedural failings.   
 Micro management: There are examples where the regulatory/supervisory 
body has become too closely involved in day-to-day management of the utility 
rather than focusing on key strategic issues such as service provision to low-
income groups.  This can introduce considerable additional bureaucracy for the 
operator and hampers both the operator’s progress and regulatory process.  
Furthermore, by blurring the role of “provider” and “client”, the “regulator” 
may reduce its ability to enforce the contract. 
 Political interference: There is an inherent danger that political imperatives, for 
instance price pressures, conflict with the principles of good regulation founded 
on proper process.  In one example political pressure was placed on a 
concessionaire to serve areas which are not financially viable, without initially 
allowing tariff adjustments and cross subsidisation from other customers.   In 
UK political imperatives have prevailed on several occasions by imposing one-
off windfall taxes on profits, or encouraging the regulator to zealously pursue 
price reduction against the longer term sustainability interests of the water 
sector. 
 
Question 6. 
 
Given the range and severity of potential pitfalls, can the regulator prevent 
external influences from damaging initiatives on pro-poor services? 
 
 
In practice however, a pragmatic balance has to be struck between the various 
pressures. In the early days of a PSP regime the regulator invariably focuses on the 
following key issues: 
 
 establishing a professional working relationship with the private operator and a 
mutual understanding of the sector issues whilst striking a balance between 
antagonism and an over-comfortable relationship. 
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 adhering to the legal and contractual powers and responsibilities described in 
the law, licence or contract, but focusing at all times on key issues that affect 
customers or potential future customers. 
 establishing numerical bases for determining whether levels of service are 
improving or getting worse.   
 periodically reviewing and updating the operator’s plan to ensure that it is 
continually relevant – especially in relation to connections, expansion and 
provision of new services (including those to low-income customers). 
 
Question 7. 
 
How can the poor feature more prominently in the professional’s list of “key 
issues”? 
 
 
3.5 Strategic Planning of Water Services  
In theory, the process of implementing PSP provides an opportunity for strategic 
planning of water services, indeed a base-line strategic plan is needed to define the 
operator’s performance and the monitoring arrangements. However the consultants’ 
experience in PSP in low-income environments suggests this is not always 
effective. Historically, there can be insufficient data and a lack of expertise for 
realistic planning which together with entrenched attitudes, can prefer crisis 
management to properly based strategic planning. As a result the base-line plans 
upon which contracts can be founded are frequently ill-informed or subject to so many 
caveats that they are deemed unreliable. Although revised plans by the PSP operator 
can be given priority, such planning may lose a year.   
 
Question 8. 
 
Is the current vogue for pro-poor policies in water sector PSP simply a legacy 
of inadequate and inappropriate planning in the past? 
 
 
3.6 Updating Strategic Plans 
A further difficulty in strategic planning of water services is that strategic plans can 
rapidly get out of date due to material changes in supply and/or demand, in 
demographics, service standards or operating cost. As a result it is generally 
accepted that rolling plans are needed with major update every three to five 
years.  
 
This creates particular difficulties for regulators, as each revised plan has a cost and 
tariff implication requiring regulatory (and occasionally political) approval. 
Experience indicates that tariff negotiations present the greatest potential for political 
interference and disputes between the parties and can distract from issues such as 
service provision to low-income customers.  
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Key regulatory issues to be addressed in approving updated strategic plans and 
periodically reviewing tariffs include: 
 
 achieving a financial balance between inflow and outflow of funds including 
loans & revenues and capex, opex, operator fees, incentive payments, dividends 
and profit repatriation.  
 the amount of funding available from external sources  
 striking a balance between price increases and service enhancements or 
expansion 
 setting achievable efficiency improvement targets over the period 
 setting standards and establishing the cost impact of service enhancements 
 
In assessing and approving updated strategic plans, the regulator may need to 
recognise and adjust for the tendency of operators to seek gold-plated, fail-safe 
solutions at higher cost (and higher reliability) in preference to lower cost (and higher 
risk) alternatives. Unless corrected in the regulatory process, this tendency can over-
state prices and hence the tariff impact and systemically cause regulators to lower 
their horizons for service enhancements of expansion of services to low-income areas. 
 
Question 9. 
 
How can a tendency for gold-plated, fail-safe solutions be stopped?  How can 
a lowering of expectation in expanding services to the poor be avoided? 
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4. 
 
Dialogue on regulation in low-income environments 
 
In Section 2 we outlined the general regulatory principles and noted how institutional 
and information constraints, together with an early focus on achieving a balanced 
approach to driving water sector strategy, can distract regulatory attention from 
improving service provision in low-income areas. In Section 3.4 we identified specific 
examples where regulatory effectiveness has been less than desirable. In this section 
we seek feedback from a global readership on how regulatory effectiveness can be 
improved and better serve the interests of low-income areas. 
 
4.1 Regulatory aspects affecting all, including low-income 
customers 
We identify below the key regulatory functions that have an impact on customers in 
low-income areas. Against each we have noted particular issues for regulators in 
relation to their duties of promoting improvement in water services to low-income 
customers. 
 
4.1.1 Planning 
 participating in and providing information to other government agencies to 
develop water policy relating to coverage and standards of service in low-
income areas 
 negotiating and agreeing with the regulated utility, appropriate service levels 
and improvement priorities for services to low-income areas 
 developing a reporting regime for assessing the regulated utility’s progress 
against agreed targets 
 promoting competition and issuing licences to new entrants or secondary 
providers  
 periodically agreeing medium term outputs, funding and tariffs with the 
regulated utility  
 
4.1.2 Enforcement 
 monitoring the regulated utility’s performance against agreed targets 
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 invoking regulatory actions in the event of performance failure  
 applying incentive and penalty mechanisms to reflect the regulated utility’s  
progress in achieving targets  
 liaison with other government agencies and supporting other initiatives for 
improving services to low-income areas  
 
4.1.3 Consultation 
 liaison with customers, including those in low-income areas to assess service 
levels and priorities for implementing improvements  
 
 consultation with customers in low-income areas as to whether standards reflect 
their needs and preferences 
 consultation with customers generally over whether current standards are 
adequately defined and appropriately measured 
 consultation over tariffs and whether prices reflect service levels and services 
delivered 
 
4.1.4 Customer representation 
 promoting the interests of customers in low-income areas 
 settling disputes between customers and the regulated utility 
 protecting customers by setting prices appropriate to service levels and services 
delivered 
 
4.2 Key questions for feedback  
 For each of the identified key regulation activities impacting on customers in low-income areas we 
seek dialogue and feedback from practitioners as follows: 
 
4.2.1 Planning 
 
a) do existing national or regional policies relating to service standards, coverage and access in 
low-income areas exist and if so are these appropriate? 
b) are the service standards, targets and priorities stated in the initial PSP contract: 
 
 realistic? 
 achievable? 
 sufficiently well defined? 
 
c) should any additional standards of service or indicators of performance be developed?  
d) do the reporting arrangements provided by the regulatory regime adequately inform the 
regulator in terms of: 
 
 progress against targets? 
 customer satisfaction? 
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 costs and benefits to customers? 
 
e) do market mechanisms and the licensing of new entrants as secondary providers: 
 
 achieve their objective by improving service provision in low-income areas?  
 increase choice to customers in low-income areas? 
 create uncertainty for the regulated water utility and reduce its commitment to improving 
service or coverage to low-income areas? 
 provide an opportunity for community involvement? 
 achieve expectations and attract sufficient new entrants? 
 
f) should secondary providers be subject to the same degree of regulation  and meet the same 
quality standards as the regulated utility? 
g) do periodic price reviews and agreement of medium-term development plans: 
 
 provide an opportunity to fundamentally revise any shortcomings in the original PSP contract? 
 provide a realistic mechanism for re-basing the contract in terms of improving services to low-
income areas? 
 address the key issues? 
 
4.2.2 Enforcement 
 
a) do progress reports from the utility to the regulator realistically represent the position in the 
field? 
b) are the contract targets for the regulated utility relevant and achievable 
c) can actual (or the threat of) regulatory action against the utility realistically provide an impetus 
to improve performance if progress is bad 
d) in connection with using incentives and penalties to stimulate progress: 
 
 is there an adequate basis on which to levy penalties or award incentives? 
 is there an optimal balance between the two? 
 how large should the incentives and penalties be in relation to total cost? 
 should incentive payments be funded from revenues or externally? 
 
e) can the regulator collaborate with other government agencies (e.g. housing or environment) to 
stimulate service improvement to low-income areas. 
 
4.2.3 Consultation 
 
a) are there adequate mechanisms for regulators to communicate with customers generally?  
b) are the mechanisms for customers in low-income areas adequate for them to collectively 
communicate with regulators? 
c) are customers generally (especially those in low-income areas) sufficiently  informed of the 
technical, legal and financial processes to be able to effectively participate in a consultation 
process? 
d) when consulting customers over future choices, can the regulator provide them with sufficient 
financial and technical information for them to provide positive input relating to: 
 
 service levels? 
 tariff levels and structures? 
 
4.2.4 Customer representation 
 
a) is the regulatory framework readily accessible to customers in low-income areas? 
b) does the regulator have adequate authority and institutional capacity to cope with 
representation from smaller groups (or is he pre-occupied with key contractual issues?) 
c) what pressures can customers in low-income areas exert upon the regulator if he fails to 
adequately represent their interests? 
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d) are the formal regulatory processes appropriate to settlement of customer disputes in low-
income areas or is a more informal approach more likely to be effective? 
e) where the regulators have secured special arrangements for customers in low-income areas, 
what commitments can customers give to honour the agreement?  
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5. 
 
Selection of past projects 
 
5.1 Data gathering 
In order to gather more evidence on regulation and the poor we examined a number of 
past projects in order to note any recurring themes relating to serving the poor. 
 
This search drew upon information available to Halcrow but was not as widespread as 
it might have been.  This may in part be due to consultants’ work mainly representing 
regulatory intentions, rather than actual regulatory practice.  However, it is hoped that 
with future participation, insights of differing regulation practice can be sought to 
further this data gathering. 
 
Additionally, acquiring the full body of knowledge on regulatory practice takes times 
to develop, as unlike the PSP strategy and PSP implementation stages, regulation has 
no fixed short-term completion point, but is an on-going entity. 
 
Nevertheless, the occurrence of some basic regulatory themes is represented in the 
table below, and the complete research is contained in Annex A.  Our sample is not 
statistically representative, and will benefit from being opened to a wider forum to 
allow greater participation and views from different perspectives.   
 
Regulation and the poor – Summary of recurring themes 
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1 Buenos Aires Water and 
Sewerage Concession 
✓  ✓  - part of 30 
year 
programme 
needs govt. 
support 
2 Guyana – water and 
sanitation sector study 
✓  ✓  not yet in 
place 
not yet in 
place 
not yet in 
place 
3 Nigeria Water : PSP 
Options Study 
✖  - - - - 
4 Greater Negombo water 
sector PSP 
✓  work on-going – not yet 
defined 
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5 Astana Water and 
Environment 
Development Project 
Zaparozhzhia Municipal 
Water Service 
Development, Ukraine 
Rostov-on-Don Strategic 
Plan, Russia 
Chisinau Water and 
Wastewater 
Rehabilitation Project, 
Moldova 
Ukraine Municipal 
Utilities Development 
Programme, Ukraine 
✓  ✖  Probably 
not 
Via elected 
representativ
es 
Can limit 
charges to 
poor 
households 
 
Legend 
✓= Yes 
✖= No 
-  = Uncertain / not defined 
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Appendix A – Selection of past projects 
 
Name of Project: Buenos Aires Water and Sewerage Concession 
Date: 1994 
Description of Halcrow 
Commission: 
Advise on the award of the concession with particular 
reference to the regulatory framework of the  concession 
 
Theme 1: 
Who is the Regulator? 
 
Is it independent? 
 
What is the (regulatory) 
financing structure? 
 
EToSS (consists of about 5 individuals) 
 
Yes – in theory  
 
30 year concession – concessionaire has to fund OPEX and 
CAPEX and gets revenue directly from customers on the basis 
of its original “bid” and allowance for tariff increases as laid 
down in the regulatory framework. 
 
Theme 2: 
Is Regulation fixed to the terms 
of the PSP Contract? 
 
Is there flexibility for the 
Regulator to be pro-active in 
promoting new servcies to the 
poor? 
 
Yes 
 
 
Yes – but there is no explicit arrangement for this in the 
contract so it would have to be negotiated with the 
concessionaire and could/would need a tariff revision. 
Expansion into “barrios marginales” – poor areas -  has already 
happened. 
Theme 3: 
How does the Regulator gather 
information / stay in touch with 
people? 
For existing customers? 
 
For those without a supply? 
 
similar to the Ofwat approach in the UK  
 
 
There exists a 30 year programme which allows for expansion 
into new (usually poor areas) but we do not have the 
information to hand 
Theme 4: 
What authority does the 
Regulator have to act on pro-
poor issues? 
 
 
Without the tacit support of the Government it is unlikely that 
the Regulator would be able to act in a pro-poor manner 
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Name of Project: Guyana – water and sanitation sector study 
Date: 1999 - ONGOING 
Description of Halcrow 
Commission: 
1 Advise on setting up a National Water Policy for Guyana 
2 Advise on regulatory framework for the new Potable 
Water and Sewerage utility ( Management contract) 
 
Theme 1: 
Who is the Regulator? 
 
Is it independent? 
 
What is the (regulatory) 
financing structure? 
 
 
Public Utilities Commission 
 
Yes – in theory 
 
The Utility presently runs at a substantial loss , indeed  
DFID/World Bank/IDB have offered financial assistance for 
transition period to “full cost recovery”. Contract has yet to be 
let. The key however will be a management contract under a 
Regulatory Framework which is currently being finalised.  
 
 
Theme 2: 
Is Regulation fixed to the terms 
of the PSP Contract? 
Is there flexibility for the 
Regulator to be pro-active in 
promoting new servcies to the 
poor? 
Regulation will be fixed to the terms of the Contract.. A major 
part of Halcrow’s studies to date have included how best to 
supply services to the poorer people – particularly in the 
hinterland which takes up about 80% of the country. The 
chosen “solution” will no doubt take this into account. How 
much flexibility the Regulator will have later will depend on the 
final “contract” 
Theme 3: 
How does the Regulator gather 
information / stay in touch with 
people? 
 
i.  For existing customers? 
ii.  For those without a supply? 
 
N/A yet as regulator not yet in place 
Theme 4: 
What authority does the 
Regulator have to act on pro-
poor issues? 
 
N/A yet as regulator not yet in place 
Any other comments: 
 
None 
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Name of Project: Nigeria Water: PSP Options Study 
Date: 1997 
Description of Halcrow 
Commission: 
Advise Federal Ministry on PSP options for the Nigerian 
water sector, based on a sample of 6 state water 
agencies. 
Theme 1: 
Who is the Regulator? 
 
 
 
Is it independent? 
 
What is the (regulatory) 
financing structure? 
 
 
The Federal Ministry of Water Resources and Rural 
Development has overall responsibility for regulation of the 
water sector, although the individual state/local governments 
had the real control over how their Agency was operated. 
A great deal of political interference is prevalent in the Nigerian 
water sector, so there is little chance for independence. 
As the water agencies do not collect a great deal of revenue 
from customers, they are entirely reliant on local govt grants 
Theme 2: 
Is Regulation fixed to the terms 
of the PSP Contract? 
Is there flexibility for the 
Regulator to be pro-active in 
promoting new servcies to the 
poor? 
 
To the best of our knowledge there are as yet no contracts in 
place. The process is most advanced in Lagos but it is not yet 
finalised.   
 
Theme 3: 
How does the Regulator gather 
information / stay in touch with 
people? 
 
 For existing customers? 
 
 
 
 For those without a supply? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Through the State Govt/Administrator (Military in 1997) 
although it was those customers with the greatest political clout 
who had the greatest influence on the Ministry.  
 
The Halcrow team saw evidence of wells being sunk in the 
middle of nowhere (but near politicians properties/village), when 
whole townships were going without. 
Theme 4: 
What authority does the 
Regulator have to act on pro-
poor issues? 
 
 
Pro-poor issues would apparently only be addressed when it 
was politically expedient to do so. 
Any other comments: 
 
None. 
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Name of Project: Greater Negombo water sector PSP 
Date: 2000 - ongoing 
Description of Halcrow  
Commission: 
Lead consultant to assist in the preparation for and 
implementation of PSP in Greater Negombo. 
Theme 1: 
Who is the Regulator? 
Is it independent? 
What is the (regulatory) 
financing structure? 
 
 
The Regulator has yet to be established, the Water Services 
Regulatory Commission Act has however been drafted. Calls for 
the establishment of a body to be responsible for 
“…..regulation of tariffs, standards and consumer protection”. 
New Regulator will regulate the whole of the Sri Lankan water 
industry. 
 
The President will appoint the three individuals who will act as 
regulators based on nominations from the Public Service and 
Judicial Services Commissions. 
 
The proposed structure will be financed by customers, such a 
regulatory charge will be identified on customers’ bills. 
Theme 2: 
Is Regulation fixed to the terms 
of the PSP Contract? 
Is there flexibility for the 
Regulator to be pro-active in 
promoting new servcies to the 
poor? 
It is expected that any PSP contract will be signed before the 
regulatory framework is up and running. In this interim period it 
has been proposed that the Operator will be regulated through 
the PSP Contract. This decision has yet to be finalised however 
and details are patchy. 
Theme 3: 
How does the Regulator gather 
information / stay in touch with 
people? 
 
i. For existing customers? 
ii. For those without a supply? 
 
Yet to be decided 
Theme 4: 
What authority does the 
Regulator have to act on pro-
poor issues? 
 
Yet to be decided 
Any other comments: 
 
None 
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Name of Project: Astana Water Supply and Environmental Infrastructure 
Development Promect. Funded by TACIS for EBRD. 
Date: 1999/2000 
Description of Halcrow 
Commission: 
Strategic plan, priority and medium-term investment 
plans, identification of PSP options, definition of a 
management contract concept.. 
Theme 1: 
Who is the Regulator? 
 
Is it independent? 
 
What is the (regulatory) 
financing structure? 
 
Municipal anti-monopolies committee 
 
Independent of the utility 
 
Theme 2: 
Is Regulation fixed to the terms 
of the PSP Contract? 
 
Is there flexibility for the 
Regulator to be pro-active in 
promoting new servcies to the 
poor? 
 
No 
 
 
Probably not 
Theme 3: 
How does the Regulator gather 
information / stay in touch with 
people? 
 
 For existing customers? 
 
 
 
 For those without a supply? 
 
 
 
 
 
Utility operational and accounting data supplied with 
applications for tariff adjustments. Standard economic indices 
and statistics. 
 
Theoretically through elected representatives 
Theme 4: 
What authority does the 
Regulator have to act on pro-
poor issues? 
 
Presidential decrees etc limiting total utility service charges in 
terms of household income. 
Any other comments: 
 
None 
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Name of Project: Zaparozhzhia Municipal Water Service Development and 
Investment Programme, Ukraine. Client EBRD. 
Date: 1999/2001 
Description of Halcrow 
Commission: 
Sub-consultant to C Lotti & Associati providing specialist 
input on institutional and organisational re-structuring for 
a corporate partnership. 
 
Theme 1: 
Who is the Regulator? 
 
Is it independent? 
 
What is the (regulatory) 
financing  
structure? 
 
 
Tariff committee of the regional (Oblast) administration 
 
Independent of the utility 
 
 
Theme 2: 
Is Regulation fixed to the terms 
of the PSP Contract? 
 
Is there flexibility for the 
Regulator to be pro-active in 
promoting new servcies to the 
poor? 
 
No 
 
 
Probably not 
Theme 3: 
How does the Regulator gather 
information / stay in touch with 
people? 
 
 For existing customers? 
 
 
 
 For those without a supply? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Utility operational and accounting data supplied with 
applications for tariff adjustments. Standard economic indices 
and statistics. 
 
Theoretically through elected representatives 
Theme 4: 
What authority does the 
Regulator have to act on pro-
poor issues? 
 
 
Presidential decrees etc limiting total utility service charges in 
terms of household income. 
Any other comments: 
 
None 
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Name of Project: Rostov-on-Don Strategic Plan, Russia. Funded by DFID 
and associated with other World Bank projects. 
Date: 2001 
Description of Halcrow 
Commission: 
Strategic plan, priority and medium-term investment 
plans, consideration of PSP options. 
Theme 1: 
Who is the Regulator? 
 
Is it independent? 
 
What is the (regulatory) 
financing structure? 
 
 
Tariff committee of the regional (Oblast) administration 
 
Independent of the utility 
 
 
Theme 2: 
Is Regulation fixed to the terms 
of the PSP Contract? 
 
Is there flexibility for the 
Regulator to be pro-active in 
promoting new servcies to the 
poor? 
 
No 
 
 
Probably not 
Theme 3: 
How does the Regulator gather 
information / stay in touch with 
people? 
 
 For existing customers? 
 
 
 
 For those without a supply? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Utility operational and accounting data supplied with 
applications for tariff adjustments..  Standard economic indices 
and statistics. 
 
Theoretically through elected representatives 
Theme 4: 
What authority does the 
Regulator have to act on pro-
poor issues? 
 
 
Presidential decrees etc limiting total utility service charges in 
terms of household income. 
Any other comments: 
 
None 
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Name of Project: Chisinau Water and Wastewater Rehabilitation Project, 
Moldova. Client EBRD. 
Date: 1997/98 
Description of Halcrow 
Commission: 
Sub-consultant to C Lotti & Associati providing specialist 
input on institutional and organisational re-structuring 
for a corporate partnership 
Theme 1: 
Who is the Regulator? 
 
 
Is it independent? 
 
What is the (regulatory) financing 
structure? 
 
 
Municipality (subject to central government controls and 
approvals). 
 
No. 
 
 
Theme 2: 
Is Regulation fixed to the terms of 
the PSP Contract? 
 
Is there flexibility for the Regulator 
to be pro-active in promoting new 
servcies to the poor? 
 
No 
 
 
Probably not. 
Theme 3: 
How does the Regulator gather 
information / stay in touch with 
people? 
 
 For existing customers? 
 
 
 
 For those without a supply? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Utility operational and accounting data supplied with 
applications for tariff adjustments.  Standard economic 
indices and statistics. 
 
Theoretically through elected representatives 
Theme 4: 
What authority does the Regulator 
have to act on pro-poor issues? 
 
Presidential decrees etc limiting total utility service charges in 
terms of household income. 
Any other comments: 
 
None 
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Name of Project: Ukraine Municipal Utilities Development Programme, 
Ukraine. Funded by DFID for EBRD. 
Date:  2000/01 
Description of Halcrow 
Commission: 
Promotion and development of management contract 
concept. 
Theme 1: 
Who is the Regulator? 
 
Is it independent? 
 
What is the (regulatory) 
financing structure? 
 
 
Tariff committee of the regional (oblast) administration 
 
Independent of the utility 
 
 
Theme 2: 
Is Regulation fixed to the terms 
of the PSP Contract? 
 
Is there flexibility for the 
Regulator to be pro-active in 
promoting new servcies to the 
poor? 
 
No 
 
 
Probably not 
Theme 3: 
How does the Regulator gather 
information / stay in touch with 
people? 
 
 For existing customers? 
 
 
 
 For those without a supply? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Utility operational and accounting data supplied with 
applications for tariff adjustments..  Standard economic indices 
and statistics. 
 
Theoretically through elected representatives 
Theme 4: 
What authority does the 
Regulator have to act on pro-
poor issues? 
 
 
Presidential decrees etc limiting total utility service charges in 
terms of household income. 
Any other comments: 
 
None 
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